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	G1kdalas	
	Sentence	
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
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3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	New York, N.Y.
4	V.	14 Cr. 0808(GHW)
5	KAREN ALAMEDDINE,	
6	Defendant.	
7	x	
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9		January 20, 2016 12:13 p.m.
10	Before:	
11		, Hoopa
12	HON. GREGORY I	
13		District Judge
14	APPEARAN	ICES
15	PREET BHARARA	
16	United States Attorney for th Southern District of New York	
17	BY: STANLEY J. OKULA Assistant United States Attor	ney
18	JOSHUA DRATEL	
19	Attorney for Defendant	
20	- also present -	
21	Virginia Faughnan, U.S. Postal Ins	pector
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THE CLERK: The Court calls the case of United States versus Karen Alameddine, 14 CR. 808.

Counsel, please state your name for the record.

MR. OKULA: Good afternoon, your Honor. Stanley Okula for the United States and seated with me at counsel table is United States Postal Inspector Virginia Colombo -- I'm sorry, Virginia Faughnan. I am still transitioning to her new married name.

THE COURT: Thank very much. Good afternoon.

MR. DRATEL: Joshua Dratel for Ms. Alameddine, your Honor, seated beside me.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. Good afternoon.

First, let me apologize for the fact this proceeding is beginning so late. This is unusual in this court and I apologize for the delay. Mr. Dratel, I'm also sorry that we were unable to accommodate your request this morning for an adjournment of this sentencing. I rejected the request mindful of the fact that there have been three prior extensions of this sentencing and with the knowledge that people who are victims of the offense might be present. I understand that a prior adjournment resulted in some victims appearing at a courtroom with no people. I didn't think it would be appropriate for me to adversely affect scheduled people who had planned for this day as a result of the fact that, as I understand it, you are under the weather.

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G1kdalas Sentence So we are here for a sentencing proceeding for Ms. Alameddine. Let me review the materials that I have received and reviewed in connection with this proceeding. First, I have reviewed the presentence report, dated January 13, 2016; the defendant's sentencing memorandum, dated December 7, 2015, together with its exhibits; the government's sentencing memorandum, dated January 10, 2016; and a letter from Mr. Jonathan Guest, CEO Hereditary Disease Foundation, dated September 10, 2015. Have each of the parties received all of these materials? MR. OKULA: Yes, your Honor, on behalf of the government. MR. DRATEL: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. Have the two sentencing memoranda been filed with the Clerk of Court? MR. OKULA: Yes on behalf of the government.

MR. DRATEL: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Are there any other submissions in connection with the sentencing?

MR. OKULA: No, your Honor.

MR. DRATEL: Not to my knowledge, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Dratel, have you read the presentence report?

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Sentence

1 MR. DRATEL: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Alameddine, have you read the presentence report?

You can remain seated until I ask you to rise. Thank you.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Have you discussed it with your counsel?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Have you had the opportunity to review with your counsel any errors in the presentence report or any other issues that should be addressed by the Court?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Okula, have you read the presentence report?

MR. OKULA: I have indeed, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any objections related to the factual accuracy of the presentence report?

MR. OKULA: Only those that are advanced in our sentencing memo --

THE COURT: With respect to restitution?

MR. OKULA: With respect -- correct, the component parts and the total figure of restitution as well as -- well, the Court has the revised sentencing guidelines so that is no longer an issue. So, yes, simply stated, with respect to the

restitution, the final number and components.

THE COURT: Thank you. I will discuss that momentarily.

Mr. Dratel, do you have any objections related to the factual accuracy of the presentence report?

MR. DRATEL: Again, restitution.

THE COURT: Thank you. Now, with respect to the amount of restitution that is due, the PSR calculates that restitution in the total amount of \$2,877,213.66 is due, consisting of \$2,123,213.66 to the HDC, 100,000 to Everest National Insurance Company, and \$578,000 to the IRS. At the same time, as just suggested by Mr. Okula, the government's sentencing memorandum calculates the amount owing to the HDC and the IRS differently. The government calculates that \$2,034,839 are owed to the HDC and \$640,144 is owed to the IRS.

Mr. Okula, can I confirm that the \$100,000 that the PSR states is due to Everest is unaffected by your calculations?

MR. OKULA: No, it would be affected, your Honor. So the gross number that is due to the HDF is the 2,034,839. The Court should and we're respectfully requesting the Court to back out the 100,000 payable to Everest, yielding a \$1,934,839 figure that's appropriately due to the HDF.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you. In which case the government's calculation of the aggregate restitution due would

result in a total restitution amount of \$2,674,983; is that correct?

MR. OKULA: It is, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. I calculate that to be \$202,230.66 less than the restitution amount calculated by the PSR. Do the parties agree with that calculation?

MR. OKULA: We do. And if it is at all helpful to the Court, your Honor, I have discussed in the wake of our submission with Mr. Guest, the CEO of the HDF, about the disconnect or disparity in our figures. And Mr. Guest has authorized me to represent that he is comfortable and supports the numbers that the government had reached and is advancing to the Court.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you very much.

Can I ask whether the parties agree that the correct amounts that the Court should use for calculating restitution are the modified amounts due to the HDC, including Everest and the IRS, as set forth in the United States' sentencing memorandum?

MR. OKULA: We believe that is the correct number, yes, Judge.

MR. DRATEL: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you.

Given that there are no objections to the factual recitations in the presentence report, I adopt the factual

recitations in the presentence report with the modification agreed to by the parties that the restitution amount owed to the HDC, inclusive of \$100,000 to Everest, is \$2,034,839 and that the amount owed to the IRS is \$640,144.

The presentence report will be made a part of the record in this matter and will be placed under seal. If an appeal is taken, counsel on appeal may have access to the sealed report without further application to the Court.

Now, although district courts are no longer required to follow the Sentencing Guidelines, we are still required to consider the applicable Sentencing Guidelines' range in imposing sentence, and to do so it is necessary that we accurately calculate the sentencing range.

In this case the defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1343, and to one count of tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. Section 7201. There is a plea agreement in this case in which the parties stipulated to a particular calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines.

Counsel, can I confirm that I am correct that the calculation in the presentence report is substantively consistent with that agreement but for the fact that the presentence report takes into account the updated November 2015 Sentencing Guidelines?

MR. OKULA: It is correct, your Honor.

1 THE COURT: Thank you.

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MR. DRATEL: Yes. The revised presentence report, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Okula, does the government agree that a two-level adjustment is appropriate in this case under Section 3E1.1(a)?

MR. OKULA: I'm sorry. You are referring to the adjustment, your Honor, for --

THE COURT: Acceptance of responsibility?

MR. OKULA: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Is the government moving for an additional one-level adjustment under Section 3E1.1(d)?

MR. OKULA: We are indeed, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I calculate the Sentencing Guidelines in a manner consistent with the presentence report. The applicable Sentencing Guidelines manual is the November 1, 2015 Sentencing Guidelines manual. The two offenses to which the defendant pleaded guilty are grouped for guidelines calculation purposes pursuant to Section 3D1.2(d).

The applicable sentencing guideline applicable to Count One, wire fraud, is Section 2B1.1, and the sentencing guideline applicable to Count Seven, tax evasion, is Section 2T1.1. Pursuant to Section 3D1.3(b), in the case of counts grouped together under Section 3D1.2(d), the offense level

applicable to the group is the one which produces the highest offense level, which in this case is Section 2T1.1.

Section 2T1.1 provides that the base offense level is derived from the tax table in Section 2T4.1. Pursuant to Section 2T4.1(i), the base offense level is 22 because the total loss amount was more than 1,500,000 and less than or equal to 3,500,000 when I aggregate the loss amount associated with the underlying fraud offense or with the tax loss associated with the tax offense.

Because the defendant failed to report or to directly identify the source of income exceeding \$10,000 in any year from criminal activity, a two-level increase is warranted pursuant to Section 2T1.1(b)(1). Because the defendant abused a position of public or private trust and used a special skill in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, a two-level increase is warranted pursuant to Section 3B1.3.

Because the defendant has demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for her offense through her plea allocation, I apply a two-level reduction pursuant to Section 3E1.1(a). Upon motion by the government, an additional one-level adjustment is warranted under Section 3E1.1(b). As a result, the applicable guidelines offense level is 23. The defendant has no criminal history points. Therefore, her criminal history category is I.

In the plea agreement, counsel, can I confirm that

	Sentence	
1	both parties agreed not to seek a departure from the	
2	guidelines' sentence, is that correct?	
3	MR. OKULA: That is correct, your Honor.	
4	THE COURT: Mr. Dratel?	
5	MR. DRATEL: For a formal departure, that is correct.	
6	THE COURT: Thank you. Nonetheless, I have to	
7	consider whether there is an appropriate basis for departure	
8	within the advisory guideline range within the guidelines'	
9	system, and while I recognize that I have the authority to	
10	depart, I do not find any grounds warranting a departure under	
11	the guidelines. In sum, the offense level is 23 and the	
12	criminal history category is I. Therefore, the guidelines'	
13	range in this matter is 46 to 57 months imprisonment?	
14	Does either party have any objections to the	
15	Sentencing Guidelines' calculation?	
16	MR. OKULA: No, your Honor.	
17	MR. DRATEL: No, your Honor.	
18	THE COURT: Thank you very much.	
19	Mr. Dratel, can I please turn to you? Do you wish to	
20	be heard with respect to sentencing?	
21	MR. DRATEL: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.	
22	THE COURT: Thank you.	
23	MR. DRATEL: And I'm not going to repeat what's in the	
24	written submission but touch on some of the things I think that	
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are important in forming the sentence. And the first is that

obviously Ms. Alameddine pleads guilty. She acknowledged her conduct very quickly -- no motions, no contest. Remorse is apparent. Remorse, however, is just a concept. The real issue is trying to somehow compensate for her conduct, and in that context, the most important aspect, I think, on a practical level as well as a legal level is restitution and what's going to happen going forward.

So the longer Ms. Alameddine spends in prison, the longer authentic restitution will be delayed, the shorter time period there will be for her viable employment life for there to be restitution. And while there is no formula for it, certainly someone who gets out — she is already 58. Someone who gets out at an age, each day, each month each year becomes more difficult to get employment that would generate the kind of income that could make authentic restitution. So all of these factors militate for, I think, a sentence that is on the shorter side, below the guidelines, with respect to jail time so that the true recompense that could be generated by her sentence would begin earlier, begin more in earnest, and last longer and be more fruitful and productive for the Foundation.

I know that the concept of general deterrence has been raised here. There is no literature that supports the concept of general deterrence as a basis for a longer sentence. In fact, the literature goes in the opposite direction; it has no impact. There is no formula for it. So automatically there is

a disparity in terms of what one judge does and what another judge does. So I think the general deterrence has to be measured in that regard. And also, even practically, general deterrence just doesn't have a place in this particular sentencing for a couple of reasons, one of which is, again, if as I think the most important aspect is trying to do for the Foundation what can be done not abstractly by more punishment but concretely, tangibly, by restitution, then general deterrence has to take a back seat to that.

The second part is that general deterrence as a matter of one sentence versus another is completely illusory. A sentence at 46 months, the bottom of the guidelines, has no bearing on general deterrence versus a sentence a year or 18 months below that. No one makes that calculation. No one says, oh, I'll commit this crime if it is only three years and not four years. There is no basis for that. That's mythological in the context of what occurs.

But more importantly, again, the lower the sentence, the earlier restitution, the better a job she can get, the more restitution she can pay, and the longer that restitution can continue while Ms. Alameddine is employable and can be viably employed given her age. And so I think all of those factors make a sentence sufficient but not greater than necessary one that is considerably below the guidelines to get to the heart of what can be done tangibly. Because while it may satisfy

certain emotional aspects of a sentence and the length, it will not be -- it will not be of any use for the Foundation as soon as we leave the courtroom. What will be of use to the Foundation will be when Ms. Alameddine can begin to make restitution in earnest.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Dratel, can I ask one question --

MR. DRATEL: Sure.

THE COURT: -- just to anticipate an argument that I expect the United States to make based on their sentencing memorandum?

Mr. Okula describes one of the, quote, enduring mysteries of this case as the whereabouts of the stolen funds. Do you wish to address that issue?

MR. DRATEL: Well, I think there are a couple of things. One is obviously a significant amount was spent pursuing a lifestyle beyond the means for which the ordinary lawful income would have supported. The second is there are some assets that the government has. I think in total it's probably — it's hard to know because some of these assets probably need to be sold so the question of what their value would be down the road or currently, I don't know. But probably in the range of a quarter of a million dollars I think of between bank accounts and property and other — personal

property and real property and things like that that are out there that the government has seized and which Ms. Alameddine obviously makes no claim to.

But, unfortunately, this was over the course of a few years, and so in the course of a few years her husband was disabled during much of this period so she is supporting him as well, and they were spending some time overseas, where he is from, and some in New York — not in New York but California at the end of the process, and so I don't know that we have a — there is no money out there that has not been turned over or seized by the government.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Can I turn to you, Ms. Alameddine? Do you wish to make a statement to the Court?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Please rise.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I want to say to Dr. Nancy Wexler, to the Foundation, to the Board, to Dr. Pardes and to Dr. Alex Wexler that I am truly sorry for what I did. And I know that I hurt a lot of people in my actions and especially the years that the Foundation put into trying to help other people and I was basically selfish. But I wanted to say that in 14 months that I have been incarcerated, I've really had a chance to look at my behavior. And it's my goal, my desire and, God willing, I will be able to pay back the Foundation

every penny that I took. And I'm very sorry for what I did, and I just hope that one day they will be able to forgive me.

And I want to apologize to my family as well.

That's all, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. Alameddine.

Mr. Okula, does the government wish to be heard with respect to sentencing?

MR. OKULA: Yes, briefly, your Honor, and I, too, do not intend to repeat all of the points we made in our sentencing memo but I would like to deal with essentially two things, your Honor, first respond to certain of the points made by Mr. Dratel and also to outline some other factors I think, most respectfully, should be front and center in the Court's consideration of where the Court should impose sentence.

First I would like to note that Mr. Guest as well as Nancy Wexler, the President of the HDF, are here in court today. Mr. Guest is here and Ms. Wexler to the far left are seated in the court.

With respect to Mr. Dratel's argument or framing of the issue as one -- or the essential goal today being how to compensate the HDF, I think, most respectfully, your Honor, that is the wrong prism through which the Court should view the important factors of sentencing. The principal reason for that, Judge, is as a result of her conviction for fraud as a professional, the defendant probably will be able to obtain

some sort of employment after she is released from incarceration, but the notion that she is going to be able to find gainful employment with these multiple fraud convictions sufficient that she is going to make meaningful compensation or restitutionary payments to the HDF I think is a farfetched notion. I just don't think — and my experience in this area sort of bears this out, having prosecuted a good number of professionals and finding out how they try to fare in the world — the working world in the wake of serving time in prison or in the wake of pleading guilty to a fraud charge. There is no meaningful, I think, compensation that she is going to experience that is beyond her own living costs and the costs for her dependents that she is going to be able to make to the HDF. I respectfully suggest that that is not the correct prism through which to view the important factors at sentencing.

I think, your Honor, the issue of general deterrence is vitally important here as well as an understanding of the incalculable harm that was caused to the HDF. Taking the second point first -- and Mr. Guest alludes to this in his victim letter but I think it is worthy of repeating to the Court. The HDF did not just suffer the monetary loss of the millions that the defendant stole over the periods of years. Their reputation was harmed, your Honor. There was and is skittishness on behalf of people who had contributed to the HDF in the past to making further contributions as a result of what

they perceived as a potential lack of control at the HDF. So that harm caused this organization, an organization that beyond dispute does terrific work for the good of mankind. The harm that they caused by even one person who may be disinclined to give as much money or may refuse to give money in the future because they saw the defendant take advantage of the trust that the HDF placed in her I think is a harm that the Court should consider very seriously when imposing sentence.

The HDF is not in the position it was before the defendant started this and before it came to light about the defendant's crimes. And so the pain, the cause to the victim in this regard I think should be front and center when the Court imposes sentence.

And more broadly speaking, I think the message of general deterrence to people who are given these positions of trust to people with accounting backgrounds and tax backgrounds who are trusted by their organizations to do good by them — after all, the defendant was allowed by the New York-based HDF essentially to carry on her duties from California because the defendant convinced the organization that her family responsibilities and other things in California should let her — they should let her work from there. For years they let her do that. They bent over backwards making accommodations for her, and the way she paid them back was essentially to engage in the acts that she did.

So the message, I think, your Honor, for people who are insiders who are trusted by organizations to keep safe their funds, particularly nonprofit organizations who are not in the money-making game but are in the do-good game, I think is important that a strong message be sent out to those people who consider whether it is going to in the end pay for them to engage in this type of conduct.

I think that covers most of the points that I wanted to cover, your Honor. I do want to address the "where is the money" issue that we alluded to in our memo. And we raise that issue, your Honor, because as part of the financial investigation we did of the defendant in a case like this, we typically ask, or look, to see whether the defendant is living beyond his or her means, whether there are numerous extravagant purchases that seem to account for where the money went. There is an absence of that here, your Honor. To be sure, there are some indications that money was spent on, for instance, this recreational vehicle that took up a couple of hundred thousand dollars and was largely financed, but beyond that and beyond some small purchases of jewelry and the like, there wasn't an extensive indication of living beyond means. No extensive real estate purchases and things like that.

So I think that there is a significant issue of "where is the money." There were indications, your Honor, that the defendant made transfers of some of the funds I think to or on

behalf of her husband, who is in the Middle East and remains in the Middle East and has not made a statement in connection with this sentencing on behalf of the defendant. The amount that wases forfeited or seized by the government totals approximately \$200,000. There is about \$180,000 in the bank account that we froze. And property wise, I think the net that is going to be brought after the marshal's sale and disposition of the assets is probably another 20 to \$30,000, bringing it to about 200,000, maybe a little bit higher, but that is a far cry from the aggregate amount that was taken by the defendant over the course of this scheme.

And my final point, your Honor, and it is tied into this issue of where is the money, Mr. Dratel in his sentencing memo, which otherwise covers all of the issue, he argues that the defendant has demonstrated basically super remorse or remorse beyond that present in a case. I submit, your Honor, that if the defendant really wanted to come clean with respect to the victim, she would have immediately upon being arrested and realizing what deep water she was in try to work with them, try to collaborate with the HDF, make an elaborate written submission about where the money went, to try to account for it in some manner or form, but we have seen nothing like that, your Honor.

So I think that a defendant who was caught redhanded, as she was, who has been incarcerated since the time of her

offense and who has met every opportunity since her incarceration to provide a roadmap to the victim about how and where the money was taken, I think the absence of that shows that her remorse is basically too little too late, your Honor.

Unless the Court has any further questions, we would respectfully suggest that the Court follow the recommendation of Probation, who recommended a 60-month sentence in this case, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. Is there any --

MR. DRATEL: Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Dratel.

MR. DRATEL: May I?

THE COURT: Please.

MR. DRATEL: First, the last bit, that actually contradicts the government's position in the sentencing memo, which is that the Sentencing Guidelines is a reasonable sentence and therefore that would have to control, that if there are two reasonable sentences below, that sentence always controls.

So to take the last points first, there is no provision, and, you know, someone in a criminal case and there is no obligation for the kind of process that the government has suggested here. But even with that, Ms. Alameddine has done that. We filed a very comprehensive CJA affidavit, and as the Court may recall, that required some effort when I came in

as counsel because of trying to list all the assets. Ms. Alameddine filed a comprehensive financial disclosure form with Probation as well. There were real estate purchases. There are horses and things like that. So there was a lifestyle that was created as a result of this. And it's impossible to prove a negative, but you would think that given the fact that the government has all of the bank records and everything, they could come up with something tangible to establish a positive — in other words, that there is money out there that is not accounted for — as opposed to making us prove a negative, which we cannot do. So in that respect I don't think that is an appropriate factor to take into account here because the facts don't establish it and the government can't just speculate about it and get a higher sentence as a result.

Second, the government suggests that she should trade prison time for restitution because restitution won't be sufficient at the end of the day. I don't think that is an appropriate doctrine for sentencing either, particularly in the context of what's at issue here. We're trying to recover every penny possible for the Foundation for the future. The way to do it is a shorter sentence, not to add time, because the full restitution may not be made within the course of Ms.

Alameddine's lifetime. I don't think that is an appropriate measure of sentencing.

Nothing about additional jail time will restore the

reputation of the Foundation. The only restoration for the Foundation at this point is monetary. When we leave here today, there will be no message to anyone. No one will get any The only people affected by this sentence will be Ms. Alameddine and the Foundation, and the lower the sentence, it will be negative for both of them. And the incremental notion of a longer sentence somehow having a general deterrence, in fact, even if general deterrence exists in the world, for which there is no literature that supports that, but even if that were the case, an incrementally longer sentence has no impact in the general deterrence context. But it does have an impact -- an incrementally shorter sentence does have an impact for what happens once this process is over and once all the emotional aspect is gone is that the Foundation will get more monev. There are families that go to watch people get executed and they don't walk away with closure. It is nearly unanimous in that regard. What matters here are the dollars that were taken and the dollars that could be given back during the course of Ms. Alameddine's lifetime. And the Court has power to set a percentage of gross income and done. So there can be authentic restitution here.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Mr. Okula, would you care to make any additional remarks?

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1 MR. OKULA: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Are there any victims present who wish to address the Court?

(Pause)

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MR. OKULA: I have been informed, because I spoke with Mr. Guest beforehand, that unless the Court has any specific inquiries, that Mr. Guest and Ms. Wexler and the HDF are prepared to rest on the submission that they made, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Is there any reason that a sentence should not be imposed at this time?

MR. OKULA: No, your Honor.

MR. DRATEL: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I will now describe the sentence that I intend to impose, but counsel will have a final opportunity to make legal objections before the sentence is finally imposed.

As I've stated, the guidelines' range applicable to this case is 46 to 57 months of imprisonment. I've considered the guidelines' range. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Booker and its progeny, the guidelines' range is only one factor that I must consider in deciding the appropriate sentence. I'm also required to consider the other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a). These include, first, the

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nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; second, the need for the sentence imposed to (a) reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense, (b) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, (c) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and (d) to provide the defendant with needed education or vocational training, medical care or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; third, the kinds of sentences available; fourth, the guidelines' range; fifth, any pertinent policy statement; sixth, the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found quilty of similar conduct; and, seventh, the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. Ultimately, I'm required to impose a sentence sufficient but no greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing that I mentioned a moment ago as set forth in the statute at Section 3553(a).

Now, I have given substantial thought and attention to the appropriate sentence in this case, considering all of the 3553(a) factors and the purposes of sentencing as reflected in the statute. Now, based on a review of all of the factors, which I will discuss in more detail in a moment, I intend to impose a guidelines' sentence of 48 months of incarceration to be followed by three years of supervised release, subject to

the mandatory and special conditions described in the presentence report, which I'll describe with more specificity later. I do expect to order restitution and to impose a forfeiture order. I do not expect to impose a fine. I will impose the mandatory fee of \$100 for each offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty. I'll discuss each of those points with more specificity after I have reviewed my reasoning.

First, this offense is, I believe, truly reprehensible. Ms. Alameddine was in a position of trust at the Hereditary Disease Foundation, a charity dedicating its purpose and efforts to curing Huntington's Disease, a devastating illness. After the only other financial person working for the organization left and she had sole care of the charity's finances as its CFO, Ms. Alameddine began to abuse that trust. Over the course of many years as described in the PSR, she orchestrated the theft of large amounts of money in a sophisticated way, taking advantage not only of the organization's trust in her but also the special skills that she applied to obscure her illegal activities.

She was very successful in her efforts to hide her activity. It was only after she voluntarily left the organization, having secreted away over \$2 million, that Ms. Alameddine's fraud was discovered. The Hereditary Disease Foundation spent large amounts of money, as I understand it, to untangle Ms. Alameddine's web of deception, and I am told that

the organization was shaken with donors and beneficiaries understandably questioning whether the HDF was the best investment of time and money in light of the revelation of the corruption of the organization's CFO.

In sum, with respect to the nature of this offense,

Ms. Alameddine stole money, stole research funds designed to

provide hope for people suffering from a devastating illness,

and in the process cheated her government and fellow taxpayers,

all to fuel what she described here as her selfishness, to fuel

her greed.

Ms. Alameddine was born in Detroit in 1957. The PSR describes that Ms. Alameddine described to the probation officer a happy childhood with her two brothers. Her father was an orthopedic surgeon. Her mother, an accountant, raised her and the other children. I understand that Ms. Alameddine's childhood was not perfect, that she suffered from two unforgivable instances of abuse. Still, she had opportunities that are frankly not available to most of the defendants that I sentence here.

My sense, as described by Ms. Willgren in her letter to me, is that, as Ms. Willgren stated, Ms. Alameddine is, quote, an exceptionally intelligent and creative individual, close quote. She worked to get her college degree and ultimately her MDA, and I understand that she did positive work at her job in the Bronx before departing to the Foundation.

I recognize that Ms. Alameddine has struggled with weight and alcoholism. She has been in therapy since age 19, including for depression and anxiety. A letter from Ms. May, highlighted in Ms. Alameddine's submission to me, describes Ms. Alameddine's situation at the Foundation as a, quote, pressure cooker, close quote, that increased her anxiety, and Ms. Alameddine's drinking issue grew worse to deal with the stress at work.

Frankly, I do not know -- Ms. May does not say -- whether the stress of her experience of that job was a result of the fact that she was perpetrating a massive, complicated fraud on her employer as opposed to any other stressor. At the same time, I recognize those are real challenges that Ms. Alameddine faced.

She has a supportive, though I understand long distance, relationship with her husband, and I know from the letters that I received that she has a supportive family and friends.

Ms. Alameddine expressed her remorse for the crime to me in letter and again here at sentencing. She has offered to agree to pay restitution and to forfeit her assets that the government has located. I appreciate both of those things, and I appreciate Mr. Dratel's remarks regarding the difficulty of proving a negative, the nonexistence of other funds. What Mr. Okula argues, though, is a positive, which is the lack of

assistance in tracing the full amount of the funds that Ms. Alameddine stole.

In this instance, given the nature of Ms. Alameddine's crime, which involved an extended, protracted deception, it's difficult for me to distinguish true remorse from regret now that she has been caught and is experiencing the adverse consequences of her decisions. The letters that I received from Ms. Alameddine and her friends and family regarding her remorse do not offset the evidence of Ms. Alameddine's poor character as illustrated by the long-running abuse of trust and stealing money from the Foundation.

While the PSR reports that Ms. Alameddine told the officer that she decided to leave the HDC because she did not wish to perpetrate the fraud any more, I cannot tell if that decision was driven by remorse or if having stolen more than \$2 million she had simply met her illegal goal. I do not know.

I believe that a significant sentence is important in this case to impose a just punishment. I'm required to consider the deterrent effect both on Ms. Alameddine personally and general deterrence pursuant to the statute. The parties' submissions on this point were quite comprehensive.

I hope that the likelihood that Ms. Alameddine will be placed in a position of trust, to steal as she did from the Foundation, is low. At the same time, she has real skills and intelligence and creativity, which I do not doubt. So I do not

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think that she will commit this crime in the same way again. I do believe that there is a need to prevent her from applying those same skills to criminal ends in the future.

Moreover, understanding the comments by Mr. Dratel, I believe that there is a real need for a significant sentence to further the goals of general deterrence. Ms. Alameddine, like other white-collar criminals, made a conscientious decision -this is what business people do, they balance risk with reward. This is a sophisticated person with an MBA who can balance risk and reward. This is not a person who is dealing drugs on the street with no other options and no ability to evaluate their choices. Given the discount to risk as a result of the difficulty of uncovering this type of financial crime, I believe that white-collar criminals should have in mind the prospect of a significant sentence as they do that mental calculation, as Ms. Alameddine did the mental calculation between the harm that she would do, her own personal needs, and the risk that she was undertaking by committing her criminal acts.

I believe that Ms. Alameddine will be able to use the period of incarceration for useful training, medical care and other correctional needs. I very much appreciate the work that Ms. Alameddine has done while incarcerated to date. I understand that she has been helpful to other inmates. I hope that Ms. Alameddine will continue to obtain help with alcohol

abuse issues. I hope that time away from alcohol together with the counseling that she will obtain in prison will help her deal with those issues. And I appreciate that Ms. Alameddine has worked over these last several months to improve herself, and I hope that she'll continue to do so after sentencing.

I have considered the kinds of sentences available. In this case, given the nature of the offense, I believe that a sentence with a term of imprisonment is appropriate. I have given serious consideration to the guidelines and the policy statements. In this case I believe that a guidelines' sentence is appropriate.

I have considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities with other defendants. I've reviewed the statistics that Mr. Dratel presented in his comprehensive submissions regarding the level of variances in this district, but ultimately by imposing a guideline sentencing I expect I'm furthering the goal of avoiding sentencing disparities in this district and by imposing a guideline sentence. Ultimately, however, as required by the statute, the sentencing decision is one that I must make, focused on the nature of the particular defendant and this offense, and I believe that this is the appropriate sentence for the defendant given my analysis of the factors set forth in the statute.

I have considered the need to provide restitution to victims of the offense and I recognize that a longer term of

incarceration will, as Mr. Dratel argues, reduce Ms.

Alameddine's opportunity to make additional money to pay restitution. I have weighed that factor in my analysis. At the same time, I take into consideration Mr. Okula's comments regarding the likelihood that further employment will make a meaningful dent on Ms. Alameddine's restitution obligations and I discount it, this factor, somewhat as a result. Still, I've considered it.

With that, Ms. Alameddine, please rise for the imposition of sentence.

It is the judgment of this Court that you be sentenced to 48 months of imprisonment with respect to Count One and 48 months of imprisonment with respect to Count Seven, with those terms to be served concurrently. I find that sentence to be sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing as set forth in 18 U.S.C., Section 3553(a)(2).

Ms.Alameddine, following your term of imprisonment, I am sentencing you to a term of three years of supervised release for each of your counts of conviction, with each such term to be served concurrently.

The mandatory conditions of supervised release shall apply. They are: The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime. The defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled substance. The defendant shall

not possess a firearm or destructive device. The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA, as directed by the probation officer.

The mandatory drug testing condition is suspended due to the imposition of a special condition requiring drug treatment and testing.

The standard conditions of supervised release 1 through 13 shall apply. In addition, the following special conditions shall apply: The defendant shall submit her person, residence, place of business, vehicle, or any other premises under her control to a search on the basis that the probation officer has reasonable belief that contraband or other evidence of a violation of the conditions of her release may be found. The search must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation. The defendant shall inform any other residents that the premises may be subject to search pursuant to this condition.

The defendant shall participate in an outpatient treatment program approved by the United States Probation Office which program may include testing to determine whether the defendant has reverted to using drugs or alcohol. The defendant shall contribute to the cost of services rendered based on the defendant's ability to pay or availability of third-party payment. The Court authorizes the release of

available drug treatment evaluations and reports, including the presentence investigation report, to the substance abuse treatment provider.

The defendant shall participate in an outpatient mental health treatment program approved by the United States Probation Office. The defendant shall continue to take any prescribed medication unless otherwise instructed by the healthcare provider. The defendant shall contribute to the cost of services rendered based on the defendant's ability to pay and the availability of third-party payments.

The Court authorizes the release of available psychological and psychiatric evaluations and reports, including the presentence investigation report, to the healthcare provider.

The defendant shall not incur new credit charges or open additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation officer unless the defendant is in compliance with the installment payment schedule.

In the event that the defendant secures a position that allows her unsupervised access and/or control over an individual, corporation's or other nonnatural persons' assets, she shall inform her employer of her conviction for this offense.

The defendant shall provide the probation officer with access to any requested financial information.

The defendant shall be supervised in her district of residence.

The defendant is to report to the nearest Probation Office within 72 hours of release from custody.

Given that Ms. Alameddine is going to be required to pay restitution and will be required to comply with an order of forfeiture, I am not imposing a fine on the defendant.

The defendant must pay to the United States a total special assessment of \$100 for each offense for which she was convicted, for a total of \$200, which shall be due immediately.

I'm ordering that the defendant forfeit all property, real and personal, involved in the offense traceable to such property, including a sum of U.S. currency totaling to at least \$1,186,856, which constitutes or was derived from proceeds traceable to the offense and which includes at least the following: (a) Any and all U.S. currency on deposit in account number 9803612739 in the name of Dean & Company LL; (b), any and all U.S. currency on deposit in account number 9804698331 in the name of Karen J. Alameddine; (c), any and all U.S. currency on deposit in account number 9804427145 in the name of Karen J. Alameddine; and (d) the various items of jewelry seized from Ms. Alameddine on November 14, 2014 and currently in the custody of the IRS, including but not limited to the specific items of property described in the Indictment for this offense.

Now, I'm also going to order restitution in an amount consistent with our discussion earlier as modified as set forth in the government's memo. The aggregate amount of the restitution that I am going to order is consistent with our conversation previously. The aggregate amount of that restitution is \$2,674,983, to be allocated among the three victims in accordance with the terms of the restitution order.

Can I ask, Mr. Okula, is there a form restitution order that the parties would like me to enter?

MR. OKULA: I don't have it with me, your Honor. What I respectfully request, your Honor, is, consistent with the Court's pronouncement today of the amounts, being given leave by the Court to present that this afternoon and deliver it to chambers together with the stipulated proposed forfeiture order as well.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Mr. Dratel, is that acceptable to you?

MR. DRATEL: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Thank you. Does either counsel know of any legal reason why this sentence shall not be imposed as stated?

MR. OKULA: No, your Honor.

MR. DRATEL: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

The sentence as stated is imposed. I find that

sentence to be sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing set forth in the statute at 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a)(2).

Thank you, Ms. Alameddine. You may be seated. Thank you.

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: You have a right, Ms. Alameddine, to appeal your conviction and sentence except to whatever extent you may have validly waived that right as part of your plea agreement. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 14 days of the judgment of conviction. If you are not able to pay the costs of an appeal, you may apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. If you request, the Clerk of Court will prepare and file a Notice of Appeal on your behalf.

Are there any other applications?

MR. OKULA: Yes, your Honor. Pursuant to the terms of the parties' plea agreement, the United States respectfully moves to dismiss at this time Counts Two, Three, Four, Five and Six, which remain open now.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Dratel, any objection?

MR. DRATEL: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. I am going to grant that motions and dismiss Counts Two, Three, Four, Five and Six.

Are there any other applications?

MR. OKULA: None on behalf of the government. Thank

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1	you, your Honor.	
2	THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Dratel?	
3	MR. DRATEL: Yes.	
4	THE COURT: Thank you.	
5	MR. DRATEL: Will the Court recommend designation to	
6	FPC Alderson, West Virginia?	
7	THE COURT: Thank you. I will be happy to make that	
8	recommendation. As you know, the BOP is not bound by it.	
9	Let me thank both of you, counsel, for your arguments	
10	and sentencing submissions. Both sets of written submissions	
11	were among the best submissions that I have received in my	
12	short time on the bench. They are very well prepared, and I	
13	appreciate the work that went into them.	
14	MR. OKULA: Thank you, your Honor.	
15	MR. DRATEL: Thank you.	
16	THE COURT: Is there anything else that we should	
17	discuss?	
18	MR. OKULA: Nothing, Judge.	
19	MR. DRATEL: No, your Honor.	
20	THE COURT: Thank you very much. This proceeding is	
21	adjourned.	
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